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ADMISSIBILITY AS CAUSE AND EFFECT: CONSIDERING 
AFFIRMATIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE CONFRONTATION 
CLAUSE 
By John G. Douglass* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"Confrontation" bespeaks action. We picture two gunslingers 
facing off on a dusty Tombstone street. In the setting of a courtroom, 
we imagine the punch and counterpunch of a vigorous cross-
examination. But when prosecutors offer hearsay in evidence, the law 
of confrontation paints a different picture. Courts treat hearsay as a 
fixed object for critical examination at trial under the microscopic focus 
of two lenses: one crafted by the law of evidence and another, almost 
identical, fashioned under the Confrontation Clause.1 The hearsay is 
either reliable or not; it comes in or stays out. Under this approach, 
confrontation is not an active process for testing hearsay. It is a passive 
screen that separates "good" hearsay from "bad" hearsay. Under this 
approach, the Confrontation Clause is not a rule of procedure. It is a 
rule of evidence.2 
'Professor of Law, University of Richmond. This essay is a slightly expanded 
version of the work in progress that I presented at the Conference on Evidence of the 
Association of American Law Schools ("AALS") in Alexandria, Virginia, June 2002. I 
wish to express my thanks to Professor Elizabeth Marsh and the AALS Conference 
Planning Committee for their kind invitation, and to the Conference participants for 
their many thoughtful comments and questions. 
l. For a more detailed treatment of the development of the United States Supreme 
Court's current approach to confrontation and hearsay, see John G. Douglass, Beyond 
Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the Right to 
Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 197-206 (1999) [hereinafter Douglass, 
Beyond Admissibility]. 
2. The Court's treatment of the Confrontation Clause as a rule excluding 
unreliable hearsay has been the subject of continuous and largely critical commentary 
for decades. Among the many excellent critiques is Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the 
Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557 ( 1988). Professor 
Jonakait argues that the Court's treatment of the Clause has rendered it a "minor adjunct 
of evidence law." Id. at 622. 
1047 
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But rules of evidence do not exist in a vacuum. Trial lawyers think 
strategically. And strategic thinking starts long before trial. Rules for 
admitting evidence inside the courtroom affect the parties' strategic 
choices outside of court. A rule excluding hearsay from an available 
declarant, for example, may lead a litigant to produce that declarant to 
provide the same evidence through live testimony at trial.3 Conversely, 
choices before or outside of trial can make the admissibility of evidence 
more, or less, fair to an opponent. For example, a party's choice to give 
notice and provide discovery regarding a potentially admissible hearsay 
statement may allow an opponent a better opportunity to meet that 
hearsay with contradictory or impeaching evidence at trial.4 
In this essay, I first examine some of the strategic choices spawned 
by the Supreme Court's "microscopic" focus on reliability in 
confrontation-hearsay cases. Rather than promoting the value at the 
core of the Confrontation Clause-the adversarial testing of prosecution 
evidence-the Court's approach leads to choices that ignore that value. 
While the Court scrutinizes hearsay under the microscope of reliability, 
it leaves the parties free to ignore and even to avoid available 
opportunities for effective confrontation of the hearsay declarant. At the 
same time, the Court's constitutional definition of reliability-which it 
equates with "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions5 -has encouraged 
prosecutors to offer, and trial courts to admit, an increasing variety of 
less reliable hearsay 
I argue for a different approach to hearsay and confrontation: an 
approach that promotes different strategic choices.6 The Confrontation 
Clause, I suggest, offers more than the "negative" right to exclude 
unreliable hearsay. It encompasses the "affirmative" right to subject 
prosecution evidence-including hearsay evidence-to a process of 
3. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 804(b). Courts and commentators sometimes refer to 
this notion as a rule of "preference" for live testimony. See id., advisory committee's 
notes. 
4. This is the principle at play in Federal Rule of Evidence 807, which admits 
hearsay under a "residual" exception, but requires advance notice to the opponent. See 
FED. R. Evm. 807. In an earlier work, I argued for an expansion of such a notice 
requirement to cover broader categories of hearsay. See John G. Douglass, Balancing 
Hearsay and Criminal Discovery, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2097, 2152-60 (2000) 
[hereinafter Douglass, Balancing Hearsay]. 
5. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
6. In an earlier article, I explored the strategic choices spawned by the Court's 
treatment of confrontation challenges to the hearsay statements of accomplices. See 
John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1797 
(2001) [hereinafter Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice]. 
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adversarial testing. And it may require prosecutors or courts to take 
affirmative steps before trial, where those steps are necessary to provide 
a defendant a fair opportunity to challenge hearsay admitted in evidence 
at trial. Such steps might include notice and discovery regarding the 
prosecution's hearsay evidence, ordering separate trials for 
codefendants where one has uttered hearsay statements inculpating 
another, depositions of hearsay declarants unable to testify at trial, and 
even use immunity for hearsay declarants who are unavailable to testify 
only because they invoke a Fifth Amendment privilege.7 
If courts recognize and enforce these affirmative confrontation 
rights, then different strategic choices will emerge. Prosecutors must 
respect those rights or risk exclusion of hearsay. And defendants must 
assert those rights or risk waiving their objection to hearsay under the 
Confrontation Clause. The constitutional debate over hearsay will shift 
away from its current narrow focus on reliability and toward a broader 
concern with the adversarial right to test prosecution evidence. In sum, 
the confrontation debate will be about promoting confrontation, not 
about avoiding it. · 
II. THE COURT'S APPROACH: THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AS A 
RULE OF EVIDENCE 
A. Confrontation and Hearsay: The Basic Dilemma 
The Sixth Amendment states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him .... "8 When a prosecution witness testifies at trial, the 
basic meaning of the confrontation right is simple enough. The witness 
physically "confronts" the defendant when she testifies in the 
defendant's presence.9 Of course, "confrontation" means more than 
7. I call such steps "affirmative rights," because they encompass more than the 
"negative right" to exclude hearsay from evidence. Indeed, I suggest that a defendant's 
affirmative right to challenge hearsay is separate from, and in addition to, any right he 
may have to exclude hearsay under the rules of evidence or the Confrontation Clause. 
But, as I argue later in this essay, the "negative" right to exclude evidence can give 
courts the necessary leverage to require "affirmative" steps by the prosecutor. See infra 
text at notes 88-90. 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
9. While physical, face-to-face confrontation is an element of the confrontation 
right in the typical case, the Court has found reasons to relax that requirement where 
necessary to accommodate other interests. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 
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passively watching while a prosecution witness launches her 
accusations. The heart of confrontation is the right to challenge the 
witness, to test her credibility and accuracy. Thus, the confrontation 
right includes an "adequate opportunity"10 to cross-examine witnesses 
who testify against the accused. 
But if the "witness against" the accused is a hearsay declarant who 
never enters the courtroom, there is-literally-no "confrontation."11 
Even more important, there is no opportunity to cross-examine. Still, it 
would be impractical to try most criminal cases without admitting some 
hearsay. And there has never been a time in our history where 
American courts barred all prosecution hearsay because it was not 
subject to confrontation. 12 So confrontation and hearsay pose an 
apparently insoluble dilemma. Hearsay seems incompatible with the 
confrontation right. Yet-as a practical matter-criminal trials need 
hearsay. 
Unfortunately, neither the Sixth Amendment text nor its history 
offers a clear answer to this dilemma. The text says nothing about 
hearsay. 13 It does not even tell us whether the nontestifying hearsay 
849-50 (1990) (permitting live, two-way closed circuit television testimony of child 
witness found incapable of communicating in courtroom testimony). 
10. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 73 (1980) (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 
204, 216 (1972)); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965); see also Davis v. 
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-18 (1974). 
11. Of course, there are cases where the declarant testifies and is immediately 
subject to cross-examination. In such cases, the Court has found no conflict between the 
prosecution's use of hearsay and the defendant's confrontation right. Cross-examination 
satisfies the right. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988); Delaware v. 
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
12. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895) (noting that "from 
time immemorial" dying declarations "have been treated as competent testimony."). For 
an eighteenth-century history of the hearsay rules, see James W. Jennings, Preserving 
the Right to Confrontation - A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 
113 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 741, 746 (1965) ("[T]he established [hearsay] exceptions had gone 
through a gradual and at times confusing development by the l 790's, and others were 
still in the process of being refined."). See also JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 5 EVIDENCE IN 
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§ 1364, at 12-28 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). 
13. The Sixth Amendment provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, 
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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declarant is a "witness" at all. Of course, if the declarant is not a 
"witness against" the accused, our hearsay dilemma disappears. The 
Clause simply would not apply to hearsay. It would serve only to 
prescribe an adversarial process for taking live evidence in a courtroom: 
essentially the process of cross-examination. 14 But that approach would 
open the door to easy abuse. Prosecutors could circumvent the basic 
right of cross-examination by having witnesses testify in private 
depositions, or through written affidavits, then bringing that collection 
of hearsay to court as the government's case in chief while keeping 
available witnesses at a distance. So the Clause must apply when the 
government uses at least some forms of hearsay. 15 
14. Wigmore reached this conclusion: 
The net result, then, under the constitutional rule, is that, so far as testimony is 
required under the hearsay rule to be taken infrajudicially, it shall be taken in a 
certain way, namely, subject to cross-examination-not secretly or ex parte away 
from the accused. The Constitution does not prescribe what kinds of testimonial 
statements (dying declarations or the like) shall be given infrajudicially-this 
depends on the law of evidence for the time being-but only what mode of 
procedure shall be followed-i.e. a cross-examining procedure-in the case of 
such testimony as is required by the ordinary law of evidence to be given 
infra judicially. 
WIGMORE, supra note 12, §1397(3), at 159. Justice Harlan ultimately agreed. See 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 93-94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I have ... become 
convinced that Wigmore states the correct view .... "). 
15. One plausible reading of the Sixth Amendment text may be that some, but not 
all, hearsay declarants are "witnesses against" the accused. If a declarant testifies in a 
setting designed to create evidence for use at a criminal trial-as in a grand jury or an 
affidavit prepared for the prosecutor-then he has become a "witness against" the 
accused. If his out-of-court statement occurs in a different setting-as when a patient 
tells his doctor about the assault that caused his wounds-then he may be a "witness" to 
the assault, but he is not a "witness against" the accused when he makes his out-of-court 
statement. At least two members of the Court have advanced this view. See White v. 
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Confrontation Clause is 
implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized 
testimonial material, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions."); 
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864-65 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that 
"witnesses against" the accused are only those witnesses to events who later give 
testimony against an accused). Professors Amar and Friedman advocate a similar 
approach. See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 
86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1038-43 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First 
Principles: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 86 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1045-49 (1998). Their 
reading of the constitutional text offers some distinct advantages. It allows for the use 
of a broad spectrum of admissible hearsay, as long as the government had no hand in 
creating it. But it prohibits the government from orchestrating out-of-court testimony, 
then using that testimony to circumvent the basic guaranty of cross-examination at trial. 
Further, this reading comports with one of our basic notions about the purpose of the 
Bill of Rights. The Framers sought to protect us against abuse by the government, not 
against slings and arrows that might assail us from other quarters. See Margaret A. 
1052 QLR [Vol. 21:1047 
History sheds only a little light on the dilemma. 16 The history of 
the Confrontation Clause, as Professor Friedman remarks, "[is] 
famously obscure."17 But even that obscure history suggests one safe 
conclusion. At a minimum, the Clause was intended to prohibit trial by 
ex parte affidavits or depositions where the accused had no opportunity 
to see and question his accusers. 18 Thus, it seems safe to conclude that a 
declarant who provides "testimony" in a government-orchestrated 
proceeding-like a grand jury or deposition-is a "witness against" the 
accused. Happily, then, the historical evidence comports with our 
common-sense conclusion that the Clause cannot be circumvented by 
allowing the government to generate hearsay as a substitute for live 
testimony. Still, we are left with other important questions and no clear 
historical answers. Does the Clause apply only to government-
sponsored, out-of-court statements, or does it go further? And 
regardless of what out-of-court statements it reaches, does the Clause 
serve as a rule of evidence that excludes such statements? Or does it 
operate as a rule of procedure that calls upon the government to 
produce the declarant? 19 Finally, like so many constitutional provisions, 
does the Clause allow for exceptions to its basic prohibitions? Can we 
"balance" away some of its protections when they conflict with other 
interests? 
The Court's early confrontation-hearsay opinions offer few 
Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a 
Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 561-62 (1992) (arguing that the 
Confrontation Clause requires a heightened standard for admitting hearsay statements 
elicited by government agents). 
16. For useful accounts of the history of the Clause, see Berger, supra note 15, at 
567-86; Graham C. Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. 
FLA. L. REV. 207, 208-15 (1984). 
17. Friedman, supra note 15, at 1022. Justice Harlan wrote that "the 
Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded parchment. History seems to give us very 
little insight into the intended scope of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause." 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
18. In its first confrontation-hearsay opinion, the Court wrote, "The primary object 
of [the Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as 
were sometimes admitted in civil cases, [from] being used against the prisoner in lieu of 
a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness .... " Mattox v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895). 
19. Writing for the Court in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), Justice 
White argued that, "objections occasioned by this practice [of trial by affidavit] appear 
primarily to have been aimed at the failure to call the witness to confront personally the 
defendant at his trial. So far as appears, in claiming confrontation rights no objection 
was made against receiving a witness' out-of-court depositions or statements, so long as 
the witness was present at trial .... "). Id. at 157. 
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answers. Those cases dealt almost exclusively with hearsay in the form 
of testimony from prior judicial proceedings. In those circumstances, 
the Court did not have to decide whether the Clause reached all hearsay, 
or only some forms of government-created hearsay. It was easy enough 
to assume-as the Court did-that a declarant who had testified in an 
earlier judicial proceeding was a "witness against" the accused at trial 
and that the Clause applied. The principal issue in those early cases was 
simply the adequacy of a defendant's opportunity to cross-examine in 
the earlier proceeding.20 Then came Ohio v. Roberts.21 
B. Ohio v. Roberts: Reliability and "Firmly Rooted" Hearsay 
Exceptions Become Surrogates for Confrontation 
In Roberts, the trial court admitted into evidence a transcript of the 
preliminary hearing testimony of a government witness who 
disappeared before trial. Defense counsel cross-examined the witness at 
the preliminary hearing. Consistent with its earlier opinions, therefore, 
the Court might have decided Roberts' confrontation claims simply by 
addressing the adequacy of his opportunity to cross-examine. But the 
Court went further. It outlined a "general approach" to determine the 
validity of all hearsay exceptions22 under the Confrontation Clause: 
[A hearsay statement] is admissible only if it bears adequate "indicia of 
reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence 
falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must 
be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness. 23 
The Roberts formula was derived through the familiar process of 
abstracting from a rule, to its supposed purpose, to a new rule aimed to 
satisfy the same purpose. And as often happens in such a quasi-logical 
process, something important was lost at each step. The "underlying 
purpose" of confrontation, the Court reasoned, is "to augment accuracy 
in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means 
to test adverse evidence. "24 Given that "accuracy" is its purpose, the 
20. For an account of the "procedural rights" theme of those early cases, see 
Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 1, at 202-03. 
21. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
22. Id. at 64-65 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)). 
23. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting FED. R. Evm. 807). 
24. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. 
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Court continued, "the Clause countenances only hearsay marked with 
such trustworthiness that 'there is no material departure from the reason 
of the general rule. "'25 Finally, the Court wrote, "certain hearsay 
exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually 
any evidence within them comports with the 'substance of the 
constitutional protection. "'26 In other words, beginning with an 
assumption that confrontation and hearsay were inherently 
incompatible, the Court embarked upon a search for second-best 
alternatives to the fundamental right to "test adverse evidence" through 
cross-examination. "Indicia of reliability" became a surrogate for cross-
examination. "Firmly rooted hearsay exceptions" substituted for any 
real measure of reliability. 
In only a few sentences, the Court had strayed considerably from 
its initial observation that the Clause ensures "an effective means to test 
adverse evidence." At the end of its sequence of substitutes, the Court 
emerged with a rule that essentially equated the Confrontation Clause 
with the hearsay rule and its many exceptions. Or at least its "firmly 
rooted" exceptions. 
C. "Firmly Rooted" Exceptions after Roberts-The "Lake 
Wobegone "27 Theory of Reliability 
Under Roberts, at least in theory, "firmly rooted" hearsay 
exceptions encompass only those statements reliable enough to render 
cross-examination an empty formalism.28 It would make sense, then, to 
apply Roberts' presumption of reliability to a limited list of hearsay 
exceptions that define a class of statements of unquestioned 
trustworthiness. Further, given Roberts' reliance on the "solid 
foundations" of "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions29 -presumably a 
reference to historical roots and foundations-it would make sense to 
limit the presumption of reliability to hearsay that falls within the 
25. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934)). 
26. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 
(1895)). 
27. "In short, the Court's test for firmly rooted hearsay exceptions has been as 
demanding as the 1.Q. tests administered to the fictional children of Lake Wobegon, and 
the result has been the same: all turn out to be above average." See Douglass, Beyond 
Admissibility, supra note 1, at 210 (citing Garrison Keiller, Monologue Excerpt, at 
http//phc.mpr.org/activities/chats-1997 /100197 _children_ hearts.html) (last visited 
October 5, 1998). 
28. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. 
29. Id. at 66. 
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traditional core of those exceptions, rather than to forms of "fringe" 
hearsay that have become admissible as traditional exceptions have 
expanded in recent history.30 But neither limit has emerged in the two 
decades since Roberts. 
To the contrary, the post-Roberts Court has welcomed most 
hearsay exceptions with little scrutiny of their historical roots or their 
real connection to reliability. The Court has presumed the reliability of 
hearsay within the exceptions for coconspirator statements,3 1 
spontaneous declarations, 32 and statements for purposes of medical 
diagnosis.33 More remarkable, the Court has accepted such hearsay as 
"firmly rooted" even after the traditional boundaries of those exceptions 
have been expanded to accommodate a broader range of less reliable 
hearsay.34 With no clear standard for assessing the reliability or 
historical pedigree of particular hearsay exceptions, the lower courts 
have been quick to follow the Court's lead, finding sufficiently firm 
roots for most exceptions. 35 
Virtually any statement admissible under the law of evidence now 
satisfies the requirements of the Confrontation Clause, with one notable 
exception. In the decades since Roberts, the Court has decided three 
cases involving hearsay statements made by a defendant's accomplice 
where the government argued that the evidence was admissible under 
the hearsay exception for statements against interest.36 Each time the 
Court held the evidence inadmissible. Each time the Court expressed 
30. For an account of the expanding world of admissible hearsay offered by 
prosecutors, see Douglass, Balancing Hearsay, supra note 4, at 2106-32. 
31. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987). 
32. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 n.8 (1992). 
33. Id. 
34. "[T]he Court has not applied its 'general approach' to fix hearsay exceptions 
within their historical boundaries. Instead, the Court has bent the constitutional limits as 
the hearsay exceptions themselves have expanded .... The hearsay 'tail' now wags the 
constitutional 'dog."' Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note I, at 211. 
35. See, e.g., Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1467 (10th Cir. 1995) (recorded 
recollection); United States v. Veltmann, 6 F.3d 1483, 1493-94 (I Ith Cir. 1993) (state of 
mind exception); United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1525 (5th Cir. 1992) (admission 
by agent); United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 42-43 (!st Cir. 1986) (recorded 
recollection); Williams v. Melton, 733 F.2d 1492 (I I th Cir. 1984) (res gestae exception). 
36. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (holding that admission of 
accomplice's blame-shifting hearsay statements violated Confrontation Clause); 
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 605 (1994) (holding hearsay inadmissible 
under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3), while declining to reach the Confrontation Clause issue); 
Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) (holding that trial court violated the 
Confrontation Clause by admitting the custodial confession of an accomplice 
incriminating the defendant). 
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concerns with the reliability of accomplice confessions that shift blame 
to a defendant. But even after three tries, the Court has yet to say just 
how accomplice confessions fit within the Roberts formula. 37 
Ill. EFFECTS OF THE COURT'S APPROACH: AVOIDING CONFRONTATION 
WHILE EXPANDING THE WORLD OF ADMISSIBLE HEARSAY 
Rules of evidence affect the parties' strategic choices before and 
outside of trial. The Roberts formula-which admits or excludes 
hearsay based on its connection to a "firmly rooted" hearsay 
exception-promotes choices that do little to serve the core purpose of 
the Confrontation Clause: to allow adversarial testing of prosecution 
evidence. And despite its purportedly strict test for reliability, the 
Roberts approach does little to limit admissible hearsay. Indeed, it may 
have encouraged strategies that have expanded some widely-used 
exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
A. Avoiding Confrontation while Debating Confrontation 
By making reliability, and ultimately "firmly rooted hearsay 
exceptions" the touchstone of admissibility, the Court has marginalized 
the adversarial right to test hearsay evidence. Few admissibility 
decisions tum upon the parties' efforts-or lack of efforts-to produce 
available declarants or to take other steps that may allow for the fair 
adversarial testing of hearsay. In making strategic choices, prosecutors 
and defense counsel ignore real opportunities for confrontation because 
they know that the admissibility of hearsay depends on something else: 
its supposed reliability. As a result, both parties are free to debate 
confrontation issues while ignoring available opportunities for real 
37. In Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999), the last of the three, the Court 
unanimously reversed a conviction based in part on an accomplice's blame-shifting 
confession. But the Court failed to achieve consensus in applying the Roberts formula. 
For a four-member plurality, Justice Stevens wrote that accomplice statements which 
implicate a defendant are not within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Instead, he 
argued, such blame-shifting statements are presumptively unreliable. See Lilly, 527 U.S. 
at 131 (plurality opinion). Concurring in the result along with two other Justices, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist maintained that "genuinely self-inculpatory" statements fall within a 
firmly rooted exception and qualify as reliable under the Confrontation Clause, even 
though they may contain elements that inculpate an accused. Id. at 146 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring). Further, the Chief Justice argued, statements against interest may qualify 
as "firmly rooted" where they are not made to the police under custodial interrogation. 
Id. 
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confrontation. 38 
This phenomenon, avoiding confrontation while debating 
confrontation, accurately describes the parties' strategic choices in many 
post-Roberts cases raising confrontation-hearsay issues. The Court's 
opinions offer a series of examples. The clearest may be United States 
v. lnadi.39 At trial, the government offered audio tapes containing 
statements of a coconspirator, Lazaro. Defendant objected, arguing that 
use of the hearsay statements deprived him of the right to confront 
Lazaro. Following the Roberts approach, the trial court ultimately 
resolved the issue by holding that coconspirator statements fell within a 
"firmly rooted" exception that satisfied the Court's reliability standard.40 
Lost in the debate over reliability was Lazaro himself, who was alive, 
subject to subpoena, and who had never asserted any claim of privilege. 
At trial, defense counsel failed even to answer the court's simple 
question, "Do you want him [Lazaro] to testify.'..i1 For its part, the 
government made only half-hearted efforts to bring Lazaro to court after 
he claimed "car trouble.'..i2 The irony of Lazaro's availability and his 
absence did not escape notice in the Supreme Court. In affirming 
Inadi 's conviction, the Court observed, "the actions of the parties in this 
case demonstrate what is no doubt a frequent occurrence in conspiracy 
cases-neither side wants a coconspirator as a witness."43 In effect, the 
prize at the heart of the debate - confrontation of the hearsay 
declarant-was easily available to either party; yet neither party cared to 
grasp it. 
lnadi does not stand alone. In Dutton v. Evans,44 the trial court 
38. In an earlier article, I discussed the phenomenon of avoiding confrontation in 
cases involving hearsay from accomplices: 
In sum, by consistently ignoring confrontation in its constitutional analysis, the 
Court has invited prosecutors and defendants to ignore confrontation as a tactical 
choice. Since admissibility turns entirely on reliability, both parties can calculate 
their Confrontation Clause strategies without regard for real opportunities to 
confront the accomplice or to impeach his hearsay. As a result, confrontation-
hearsay arguments often become a game of Sixth Amendment "chicken," with 
both parties pursuing an all-or-nothing battle over the reliability-and, hence, the 
admissibility---0f hearsay, while neither is really anxious to see the accomplice on 
the witness stand. 
Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, supra note 6, at 1850. 
39. 475 U.S. 387 (1986). 
40. Id. at 399-400. 
41. Id. at 388-89. 
42. Id. at 390. 
43. lnadi, 475 U.S. at 397 n.7. 
44. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). 
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admitted an accomplice's jailhouse confession implicating Dutton. 
While vigorously pursuing a claim that admission of the hearsay denied 
Dutton the right of confrontation, defense counsel candidly 
acknowledged that he could have called the accomplice-declarant as a 
witness but elected not to do so.45 In White v. lllinois,46 the trial court 
admitted hearsay statements from a child declarant. The Court 
entertained defendant's Confrontation Clause claims, even though the 
defense made no effort to call the child as a witness. And the Court 
allowed the hearsay, even though the trial court never found that the 
prosecutor had exhausted efforts to make the child available to testify in 
person.47 Likewise in Lilly v. Virginia,48 the Court's most recent 
confrontation-hearsay opinion, both parties passed up opportunities to 
confront the accomplice-declarant whose hearsay statements were the 
focus of their debate.49 In the final analysis, it did not matter that 
confrontation may have been available if either party had wanted it. 
The relevant debate, in the eyes of the Court, was all about reliability 
and "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions. 
This phenomenon of avoiding confrontation extends beyond cases 
where the hearsay declarant may be literally, physically available for in-
court confrontation. The law of evidence offers a wealth of 
opportunities for adversarial testing of hearsay even where the declarant 
is unavailable.50 In the debate over confrontation and hearsay, one 
45. Id. at 88 n.19 ("Counsel for Evans informed us at oral argument that he could 
have subpoenaed [the declarant] but had concluded that this course would not be in the 
best interests of his client."). 
46. 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
47. In White, the prosecutor at least tried to call the child as a witness, but 
ultimately failed when the child suffered emotional breakdowns. Id. at 350. The 
defense made no effort to call the witness. Id. And the trial court never made a finding 
that the child was unavailable. Id. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that no finding 
ofunavailability was required for admission of the hearsay. White, 502 U.S. at 354. 
48. 527 U.S. 116 (1999). 
49. See Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, supra note 6, at 1800 nn. 
7, 8. 
50. Federal Rule of Evidence 806 provides that an opponent of hearsay may attack 
the credibility of the declarant "by any evidence which would be admissible for those 
purposes if declarant had testified as a witness." Many states have comparable statutes. 
See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN, ET AL., 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 806-14, 806-17 (1996); 
cf UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 806 (1974) (virtually identical to Fed. R. Evid. 
806). Experienced judges and trial advocates have extolled the virtues of Rule 806. See 
Fred Warren Bennett, How to Administer the "Big Hurt" in a Criminal Case: The Life 
and Times of Federal Rule of Evidence 806, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 1135, 1168 (1995) 
(calling Rule 806 an "invaluable tool" for trial lawyers); Margaret Meriwether Cordray, 
Evidence Rule 806 and the Problem of Impeaching the Nontestifying Declarant, 56 
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might expect that such opportunities would become a natural focus. 
After all, where live cross-examination may be impossible, shouldn't it 
matter if an effective substitute is available for testing the credibility and 
accuracy of the declarant? Shouldn't it matter if the defendant can 
effectively impeach the declarant with prior inconsistent statements, 
criminal convictions, bad acts, evidence of bias and other impeaching 
material in much the same way he might impeach a live witness? But 
after Roberts, in considering objections to hearsay, the Court has never 
weighed the likely effectiveness of opportunities to impeach an absent 
declarant. 51 And nothing in the Roberts formula gives defendants any 
incentive to pursue such opportunities.52 
In sum, the Court has given us a confrontation-hearsay doctrine 
that has little to do with confrontation. As a result, when making 
strategic choices that frame confrontation-hearsay issues at trial, the 
parties need not-and typically do not-make choices that lead to 
confrontation. 
B. Expanding the World of Admissible Hearsay 
A natural effect of a rule excluding hearsay would be to encourage 
would-be proponents of hearsay to seek other means to prove their 
cases. In theory at least, hearsay exceptions that apply only where the 
declarant is "unavailable" are designed with just such an effect in 
Omo ST. L. J. 495 (1995); Hon. Anthony M. Brannon, Successful Shadowboxing: The 
Art of Impeaching Hearsay Declarants, 13 CAMPBELL L. REV. 157, 158 (1991) (noting 
trial lawyers' neglect of "golden opportunities" to impeach hearsay declarants). For a 
detailed account of the art and efficacy of"virtual cross-examination, i.e., the practice of 
impeaching an absent hearsay declarant, see Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 
1, at 251-60. 
51. Twice the Court has considered a criminal defendant's right to impeach a 
hearsay declarant, but both times the issue turned on interpretation of the law of 
evidence. See Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694 (1897); Mattox v. United States, 
156 U.S. 237, 244-50 (1895). 
52. Of course, even without a constitutional incentive to pursue confrontation, we 
might expect defendants who lose the battle over admissibility of hearsay to beat a 
tactical retreat to the "second-best" choice of impeaching the hearsay declarant under 
Rule 806 and similar provisions. But experience suggests that defendants typically 
forego that opportunity. See Brannon, supra note 50, at 158. The reasons, I have 
suggested elsewhere, may be tactical choices by defendants that (I) impeachment is 
unnecessary because juries discount hearsay, or that (2) impeachment may diminish the 
likely success of arguments to exclude hearsay and the likelihood of appellate reversal 
from decisions admitting hearsay. In other words, defense counsel may "value the 
confrontation issue more than the confrontation itself." Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, 
supra note 1, at 222-23. 
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mind.53 In Roberts itself, the Court initially applied the same theory in 
its Confrontation Clause analysis. The government could rely on 
hearsay only where the live version was unavailable. 54 But the Court 
quickly recognized the practical difficulties of a rule requiring the 
presence of the declarant in so many cases where the law of evidence 
had never imposed such a limit. Only a few years after Roberts, the 
Court retreated, admitting "firmly rooted," and, therefore, "reliable" 
hearsay in most cases without regard to the availability of the 
declarant. 55 
By making "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions the test for 
admissibility under the Confrontation Clause without regard to the 
availability of the declarant, the Court encouraged a new kind of 
strategic thinking by prosecutors. Since the Court had linked 
confrontation rights to the hearsay rules, prosecutors had an added 
incentive to pursue strategies that might liberalize the hearsay rules 
themselves. Not surprisingly then, Roberts quickly led prosecutors to 
pigeonhole56 more and more hearsay into "firmly rooted" exceptions 
and thereby to avoid a separate constitutional inquiry.57 Courts and 
legislatures readily obliged such creativity by expanding the boundaries 
of traditional exceptions in order to admit more hearsay.58 Over the 
53. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b), advisory committee's note ("The rule [requiring 
unavailability as a condition for admitting hearsay] expresses preferences: testimony 
given on the stand in person is preferred over hearsay, and hearsay, if of the specified 
quality, is preferred over complete loss of the evidence of the declarant."). 
Unfortunately, rules requiring unavailability can create a different kind of incentive 
where one party retains some control over the availability of a witness, as a prosecutor 
may do by granting or withholding use immunity. A prosecutor in possession of 
favorable hearsay from a reluctant declarant may choose to withhold immunity, and 
thereby keep the declarant "unavailable," in order to make the hearsay admissible. The 
prosecutor "can satisfy the law of evidence only by avoiding confrontation." Douglass, 
Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, supra note 6, at 1851. 
54. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980). 
55. The first step in that retreat came in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 
(1986), where the Court ruled that coconspirator statements were admissible 
notwithstanding the availability of the declarant. lnadi, 475 U.S. at 399-400. Six years 
later, in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), the Court held that unavailability was a 
Sixth Amendment prerequisite only for admission of prior testimony. White, 502 U.S. 
at 354. 
56. For a more extensive discussion of the "pigeonholing" of new hearsay into old 
exceptions after Roberts, see Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note l, at 210-14. 
57. The incentive exists because, under the Roberts analysis, firmly rooted 
exceptions offer a safe harbor from Confrontation Clause challenges. See Roberts, 448 
U.S. at 66. The convenience of Roberts is hard to resist. Two issues-hearsay and 
confrontation-get turned into one. 
58. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), offers a good example. There, an 
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objections of Justice Blackmun,59 the author of Roberts, the Court gave 
at least its implicit blessing to that expansion, treating the newly 
expanded categories of hearsay as "firmly rooted" nonetheless.60 
Suddenly, "firm roots" took on a distinctly modem look: new hearsay 
had become old hearsay. 
As a result, the Roberts approach-which seems designed to keep 
prosecution hearsay within traditional limits - probably had the opposite 
effect on the law of evidence. Instead of excluding hearsay at the 
margins of traditional "firmly rooted" exceptions, courts expanded the 
margins to embrace more hearsay. Post-Roberts decisions at all 
levels-including several from the Supreme Court itself-simply put 
old labels onto new forms of hearsay. And Roberts made those labels 
matter more than ever before. The Roberts formula, originally designed 
to admit hearsay with "solid foundations" of reliability, had made it 
easier for hearsay of marginal reliability to pass constitutional muster. 
IV. AN "EFFECTIVE MEANS TO TEST ADVERSE EVIDENCE": THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AS A RIGHT TO CONFRONT HEARSAY 
The Roberts formula does not promote confrontation. It promotes 
traditional hearsay labels as a talisman for reliable hearsay, and it 
substitutes reliability for the adversarial right at the core of the 
Illinois trial court had admitted a child's hearsay statements under the exceptions for 
spontaneous declarations and for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis. 
White, 502 U.S. at 350. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, but in doing so it 
acknowledged that it had relaxed traditional limits on the admissibility of spontaneous 
declarations, People v. White, 555 N.E.2d 1241, 1246-50 (Ill. App. 1990), and that it 
had relied on a "new hearsay exception" enacted in 1988 to expand the "medical 
diagnosis" exception beyond its historical boundaries, White, 555 N.E.2d at 1251. 
59. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 186 (1987) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) ("[B]ecause the Court alters the traditional hearsay exemption ... I do not 
believe that the Court can rely on the 'firmly rooted hearsay exception' rationale [of 
Roberts], to avoid a determination whether any 'indicia of reliability' support the co-
conspirator's statement, as the Confrontation Clause surely demands."). 
60. See id. Bourjaily challenged the admissibility of coconspirator statements 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 80l(d}(2)(E), and further argued that their admission 
violated the Confrontation Clause. In its ruling on the evidentiary issue, the Court 
abandoned the traditional rule which had required trial courts to find independent 
evidence of conspiracy before admitting a co-conspirator's statements. The Court found 
that Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) eliminated the traditional restriction. Id. at 176-81. 
Despite the fact that it had expanded the traditional exception only a few pages earlier in 
order to accommodate the government's hearsay, the Court found that the statements 
fell within the "firmly rooted" exception. Id. at 181-84. The Court gave similar 
treatment to Illinois' newly expanded hearsay exceptions in White. See 502 U.S. at 357. 
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Confrontation Clause. Because those substitutes are what matters in 
today's confrontation-hearsay debates, the strategic choices of 
prosecution and defense simply ignore confrontation and focus on 
hearsay labels. The result is a confrontation doctrine that has little to do 
with confrontation. In other words, confrontation-hearsay analysis is 
consumed with the "negative" right to exclude unreliable hearsay. I 
argue that it should focus instead on the "affirmative" right to 
"confront" hearsay: the right to subject hearsay to adversarial testing 
just as we test live testimony through cross-examination.61 
The "underlying purpose" of confrontation, according to Roberts, 
is "to augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the 
defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence."62 That starting 
point is almost, but not quite, correct. Augmenting accuracy may be an 
indirect result of the confrontation right; but it is not the right itself.63 
The Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence. Even a 
cross-examined witness may lie and his lies may escape detection. 
Conversely, we allow-indeed we expect--defense counsel to cross-
examine even the most reliable witnesses. Instead, as the Roberts Court 
recognized before it began its hunt for surrogates, the right to confront 
witnesses is the right to "an effective means to test adverse evidence."64 
That is what the confrontation right means when a live witness testifies 
for the prosecution.65 And, I suggest, it means the same thing when the 
"witness against" the defendant is a hearsay declarant. Where the law 
of evidence allows prosecutors to use hearsay, the Confrontation Clause 
grants defendants an opportunity to challenge it: that is, an opportunity 
to impeach or contradict the declarant's "testimony" just like testimony 
from any other witness. 
This approach is easy enough to envision when the declarant is 
available for live testimony.66 Why should we treat the Confrontation 
61. See Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 1, at 224-40 (arguing that the 
Confrontation Clause creates a right to "confront" hearsay, that is to subject otherwise 
admissible hearsay to a process of adversarial testing). 
62. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980). 
63. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
("[T]he Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence; it guarantees 
specific trial procedures that were thought to assure reliable evidence .... "). 
64. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. 
65. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-18 (1974); Brookhart v. Janis, 
384 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1966). 
66. In cases where the declarant actually testifies, the Court readily has reached 
this conclusion. See United States v. Owen, 484 U.S. 554, 558-61 (1988); Delaware v. 
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19-22 (1985); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 628-29 (1971); 
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Clause as a standard for "reliable" hearsay when confrontation is-
literally-possible? If defendant wants confrontation, then let him have 
confrontation. When the declarant is available, the simple answer to the 
confrontation dilemma is to call the declarant as a witness if the 
defendant wants to cross-examine. Members of the Court have skirted 
this solution on a few occasions, but never fully embraced it. In Inadi, 
the Court noted that calling the declarant would resolve the defendant's 
concerns, but then-inaccurately, I suggest-assigned that right to the 
Compulsory Process Clause.67 Months before Inadi, Justice Harlan had 
argued that history called for a similar approach: "[T]he Confrontation 
Clause," he wrote, "reaches no farther than to require the prosecution to 
produce any available witness whose declarations it seeks to use in a 
criminal trial."68 He later backed away, believing it impractical to 
require production of the declarant in many cases where hearsay had 
been routinely admitted without calling the declarant.69 In my view, 
Justice Harlan's practical dilemma is less severe than he imagined.70 
And his basic idea is sound. Where the declarant is available and 
hearsay is admitted, the Confrontation Clause allows a defendant to 
demand confrontation, and to get it. 
But what about cases where the declarant is truly unavailable: 
where he is dead, unable or unwilling to testify, or far beyond the 
court's subpoena power? The Court's confrontation-hearsay decisions 
start with the assumption that "confrontation" is impossible in such 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158-59 (1970). 
67. United States v. lnadi, 475 U.S. 387, 397 (1986) ("If [defendant] 
independently wanted to secure [the declarant's] testimony ... [t]he Compulsory 
Process Clause would have aided [him] in obtaining the testimony."). Jnadi's reliance 
on Compulsory Process, I contend, is misplaced. See Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, 
supra note 1, at 244. 
68. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
69. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95-96 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(arguing that producing the declarant would be "unduly inconvenient and of small 
utility" in cases of, e.g., hearsay admitted as a business record). 
70. The practical inconvenience of producing every available hearsay declarant for 
all prosecution hearsay is greatly diminished if we require a defendant to assert his 
confrontation right in the first instance, and then to exercise that right. As a practical 
matter, that would resolve the issue in most cases. Few defendants are likely to care 
about confrontation with, for example, a series of clerks who enter the data supporting 
most admissible business records. Indeed, as lnadi and Dutton, and perhaps White and 
Lilly, suggest, most defendants would prefer to avoid actual confrontation with most 
declarants most of the time. And courts are well equipped to deal with frivolous 
demands to produce witnesses whom the defense shows no real interest in cross-
examining. 
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cases. 71 So the Court turns to reliability as a surrogate for the real thing 
that, it assumes, is beyond reach. In my view, we should not jump so 
quickly to the conclusion that effective means of "confrontation" are 
impossible just because the declarant is not physically available. And, if 
we are to tum to a surrogate for physical confrontation, then we should 
consider the next best alternative. We should treat the Confrontation 
Clause as a right to any available means to subject even absent 
declarants to a process of adversarial testing. If we did so, we would 
have a doctrine that, as a practical matter, grants defendants more 
effective tools for responding to hearsay than are currently available 
under the Roberts formula for admitting "reliable" or "firmly rooted" 
hearsay. And we would restructure strategic choices in a way that 
promoted the core value of confrontation. 
V. PROMOTING DIFFERENT STRATEGIC CHOICES: AFFIRMATIVE 
CONFRONTATION RIGHTS OUTSIDE OF TRIAL 
When presented with prosecution hearsay, courts following the 
Roberts formula must ask, "Is it reliable?" or-even more narrowly-
"Is it within a firmly rooted exception?" I suggest that a better question 
would be, "What steps have been taken, and what steps can we now 
take, to allow for a fair adversarial challenge to this hearsay?" Courts 
asking that question would not be engaged in a passive, microscopic 
analysis of hearsay. They would challenge the defendant to exercise the 
very confrontation rights he claimed to assert. And they would 
challenge the prosecutor to respect those rights. The Confrontation 
Clause would encompass "affirmative rights" to steps before and 
outside of trial, where such steps were necessary to allow for the fair 
adversarial testing of hearsay at trial. 
71. Beginning with Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240-41 (1895), the 
Court has always framed the confrontation-hearsay issue as a question of admissibility, 
assuming that hearsay and confrontation were simply incompatible. See Douglass, 
Beyond Admissibility, supra note 1, at 230. As a result, the Court's confrontation-
hearsay cases begin with the premise that some categories of hearsay must fall within 
an "exception" to the basic rule requiring confrontation. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243 
(noting that the right of confrontation is "subject to exceptions, recognized long before 
the adoption of the Constitution, and not interfering at all with its spirit."). 
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A. The Case for Affirmative Confrontation Rights that Reach Beyond 
the Trial 
We often use the trial process in general, and the rules of 
admissibility in particular, as a means for enforcing rights that govern 
conduct outside of trial. The Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule is 
a prime example, 72 as is the doctrine excluding confessions obtained in 
violation of Miranda. 13 Conversely, in deciding whether the trial 
process-including its rules of admissibility-is fair, we often consider 
the impact of conduct and choices made outside of trial. Under Brady v. 
Maryland, 74 for example, we reversed a conviction where the 
prosecutor's pretrial decision not to disclose exculpatory evidence 
caused us to lose confidence in the result at trial. 75 
There are equally obvious cause-and-effect connections between 
the basic Sixth Amendment right to a fair, adversarial trial on the one 
hand, and a variety of pretrial events on the other. A number of the 
Court's Sixth Amendment rulings pay heed to those connections. The 
right to counsel, for example, attaches not just at the start of trial, but at 
the moment defendant is formally charged with a crime. 76 It 
encompasses the pretrial right to an adequate opportunity to prepare for 
trial.77 It calls for counsel's presence at critical pretrial proceedings that 
may affect the right to effective cross-examination at trial. 78 At least 
one of the Sixth Amendment's guarantees-the defendant's right to 
"compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor"79 --<leals 
explicitly with a process that begins before and outside of trial in order 
to assure presentation of a defense at trial. Indeed, the Sixth 
72. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Of course, there remains the debate 
whether the only right protected by the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is a right 
that exists outside of trial. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 931-32 (1984) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
73. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
74. 373 U.S. 83, 87-89 (1963). 
75. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985) (noting that exculpatory 
evidence left undisclosed by a prosecutor is "material" where nondisclosure 
"undermines confidence in the outcome."). 
76. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (holding that right to counsel 
attaches "at or after the [time that] adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated ... 
whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or 
arraignment."). 
77. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
78. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
79. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
1066 QLR [Vol. 21:1047 
Amendment's opening phrase, "in all criminal prosecutions,"80 seems 
calculated to reach conduct before and beyond the time and place of a 
criminal trial. 
In order to secure the right to effective confrontation at trial, courts 
and parties may need to take steps before and outside of trial. Several of 
the Court's early confrontation-hearsay opinions implicitly rely on that 
cause-and-effect connection, excluding hearsay at trial not based on its 
unreliability, but as a sanction where the government neglected pretrial 
opportunities to bring about confrontation at trial. In Barber v. Page,81 
for example, the Court excluded hearsay under the Confrontation Clause 
where the government made no effort to secure the attendance of a 
declarant who was in prison. A century ago, in Motes v. United States,82 
the Court likewise excluded hearsay where declarant's absence at trial 
was due to government negligence in releasing him from jail and failing 
to monitor him. 
In sum, the notion of an affirmative right to confront hearsay-a 
right that would create pretrial obligations for prosecutors and exclude 
evidence as a sanction for ignoring those obligations-is hardly 
unprecedented. It is consistent with the Court's treatment of other Sixth 
Amendment guarantees, and with the constitutional text. At least in 
cases where declarants were subject to government control, and before 
the modern Court's preoccupation with reliability, it was a right which 
the Court readily recognized and enforced. 
B. Defining Affirmative Rights under the Confrontation Clause 
The project of defining limits for constitutional principles is 
typically illuminated by reported cases where the litigants themselves 
have struggled over such limits. But the right to confront hearsay offers 
a different challenge. Because the Roberts reliability-based formula has 
so thoroughly preempted the field of confrontation-hearsay litigation, 
we are left largely to fend for ourselves. In the paragraphs that follow, I 
do not pretend to exhaust this subject. 83 Instead, I will offer a few basic 
80. See id. (emphasis added). 
81. 390 U.S. 719, 723 (1968). 
82-. 178 U.S. 458, 471 (1900). 
83. For an application of the affirmative "right to confront hearsay" in the specific 
case of accomplice-declarants, see Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 
supra note 6, at 1859-74. For a more general introduction to the concept of affirmative 
confrontation rights outside of trial, see Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 1, at 
264-71. 
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observations that, I hope, will contribute to a continuing discussion. 
First, I suggest a simple starting point: at a minimum, the 
prosecutor should do no harm. 84 Where the government elects to off er 
hearsay, courts should scrutinize prosecutorial choices that may inhibit 
confrontation. Choices that restrict a defendant's opportunity to test 
hearsay should likewise diminish the government's opportunity to prove 
its case through hearsay. In other words, the government should not 
have its (hearsay) cake and eat it too. The problems of joinder and trial 
order illustrate the point. In cases involving multiple defendants, 
prosecutors enjoy considerable discretion in deciding whether to indict 
and try defendants together or separately, and in what order to prosecute 
separate cases. But, as Lilly85 demonstrates, those choices can 
determine whether one defendant-declarant is available to testify at the 
trial of a codef endant, or whether a pending charge will leave the 
declarant to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege while the government 
offers his hearsay in evidence. 86 As a general rule, the Sixth 
Amendment does not govern a prosecutor's charging decisions. But it 
should prevent joinder or trial order calculations from becoming tools 
for insuring the "unavailability" of accomplice declarants when the 
government has accomplice hearsay at its disposal. 87 
84. Motes illustrates this point. There, the government had effective control of an 
incarcerated witness, but chose to release him and took no steps to monitor him. He 
disappeared before trial and the prosecution offered his hearsay statements from earlier 
testimony. The Court excluded the hearsay, at least in part because the government's 
negligence had deprived defendant of an opportunity for confrontation. See Motes, 178 
U.S. at 471. 
85. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999). 
86. In lilly, defendant's brother, Mark Lilly, was called as a witness by the 
prosecutor, but became "unavailable" to testify when he asserted his Fifth Amendment 
privilege. The court then allowed the prosecutor to introduce a tape recorded hearsay 
statement in which Mark implicated the defendant as triggerman in a murder. Lilly, 527 
U.S. at 122. In retrospect at least, the prosecutor's strategy seems calculated to keep 
Mark off the witness stand. Before Ben Lilly's trial, the prosecutor had entered a plea 
bargain to obtain the cooperation and testimony of another accomplice-witness. But it 
treated Mark Lilly differently, perhaps calculating that brotherly loyalty might diminish 
Mark's value as a live witness. Shortly after Ben Lilly's trial, Mark pied guilty to first 
degree murder and received a sentence of forty-nine years. See Brief for Petitioner at 7, 
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999). It seems likely that the prosecution chose to 
delay Mark's trial or plea in order to deter him from taking the stand at Ben's trial, 
changing his story and exonerating Ben. See id. (prosecution kept the "option of 
charging Mark Lilly as the trigger man ifhe change[d] his story during his brother's trial 
and trie[d] to take the blame.") (citing Lisa K. Garcia, Slaying Suspect 's Trial Starts 
Today, THE ROANOKE TIMES, Oct. 15, 1996, at A2). 
87. While the Court's decision in Lilly obviously limits the government's 
opportunity to rely on blame-shifting hearsay from an accomplice, as the prosecution 
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Second, hearsay should carry a price. The price should be 
whatever is necessary to maintain a fair adversarial balance. 
Prosecutors seeking to rely on hearsay should be required to take any 
steps reasonably necessary to allow the defense an opportunity for 
effective testing of that hearsay, even where such steps exceed a 
prosecutor's typical obligations or intrude on otherwise discretionary 
decisions. And exclusion of hearsay can be an appropriate means to 
compel such steps. For example, the decision to grant use immunity to 
a witness normally is within the prosecutor's discretion. Indeed, under 
typical immunity statutes, courts have no power to grant use immunity 
without a motion from the govemment.88 But imagine the case, like 
Lilly, where the prosecution offers hearsay from a declarant who is 
unavailable to testify only because he asserts his Fifth Amendment 
privilege. Now the balance of immunity-granting power has shifted. 
The court can put the government to a choice: Grant use immunity to 
the declarant, or forego the use of hearsay. 89 In many cases, that 
immunity may be granted with no real risk to the government. And it 
can restore the right of confrontation with the simple stroke of a pen. It 
is, in short, a reasonable price for maintaining an adversarial process 
where the government seeks to rely on hearsay. 
Third, a defendant who asserts a confrontation right should attempt 
to exercise that right. At first blush, this suggestion may seem to tum 
the Sixth Amendment guarantee upside down. After all, the right "to be 
confronted" with government witnesses seems to call for nothing in the 
way of action from the defense. But even when a prosecution witness 
had attempted to do in Lilly itself, the decision has not eliminated the problem. As post-
Lil/y decisions in lower courts are beginning to demonstrate, a considerable variety of 
accomplice hearsay is still admitted. See United States v. Papajohn, 212 F.3d 1112, 
1118-20 (8th Cir. 2000) (admitting grand jury testimony of unavailable accomplice 
based upon circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness); United States v. Boone, 229 
F.3d 1231, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming conviction where trial court admitted 
accomplice's statements against interest made to girlfriend); United States v. Shea, 211 
F.3d 658, 669 (1st Cir. 2000) (admitting statements against interest made to friends). 
88. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03 (1994). 
89. By requiring this choice, courts can allow both hearsay and confrontation. 
Unfortunately, at least where the government relies on the hearsay exception for 
statements against interest, the law of evidence stands in the way of this solution. When 
she grants use immunity and thereby makes a declarant available to testify, a prosecutor 
loses the chance to introduce hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), which 
requires that the declarant be "unavailable." Current hearsay rules and confrontation 
doctrine create a Catch-22. The prosecutor can satisfy the rules of evidence only by 
avoiding confrontation. See Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, supra 
note 6, at 1850-53. 
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testifies in person at trial, the right of confrontation is not self-executing. 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an opportunity to cross-examine.90 
Still, defendant must seize that opportunity or he waives that right.91 In 
my view, we must apply a similar analysis in defining defendant's right 
to confront hearsay. Otherwise, we are mired in the current system of 
perverse incentives, where defendants can, and often do, assert the right 
to confrontations they do not want.92 If the declarant can be made 
available, then any defendant who raises a Confrontation Clause 
objection to hearsay must be prepared to answer "Yes" to the simple 
question, "Do you want to cross-examine the declarant?" If the 
declarant is unavailable, then defendant is entitled to use any reasonably 
available means to impeach him in absentia. Of course, defendant is 
entitled to make the tactical choice not to pursue such avenues for 
impeachment. But in ruling on the fairness of admitting hearsay, courts 
nevertheless should take into account any opportunity the defendant 
chooses to eschew. 
Fourth, information and preparation are the keys to effective 
adversarial testing of evidence. The affirmative right to test prosecution 
hearsay, therefore, must include rights to notice and discovery.93 
Effective cross-examination of a prosecution witness begins before trial 
with the collection of "ammunition": the prior convictions, inconsistent 
statements, evidence of disreputable acts and other information that will 
give substance and direction to the cross-examiner's questions. 94 
Indeed, most cross-examination has little to do with asking real 
questions, and a lot to do with exposing that "ammunition" to the jury 
through "questions" with already predictable answers.95 Likewise, an 
effective adversarial assault on the hearsay declarant may depend less 
on the declarant's presence than on the information a defendant can 
obtain about the declarant, and about his hearsay statements. At a 
minimum, discovery rules that apply to prosecution witnesses must 
90. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-18 (1974); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 
U.S. 415, 418 (1965). 
91. See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa, 976 F.2d 1446, 1457 (1st Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Howard, 751 F.2d 336, 338 (10th Cir. 1984). 
92. See supra text at notes 39-50. 
93. See Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note l, at 264-69. 
94. "[T]he right of cross-examination also may be significantly infringed by events 
occurring outside the trial itself, such as the wholesale denial of access to material that 
would serve as the basis for a significant line of inquiry at trial." Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 66 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
95. See STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY 105 (2d ed. 1997); THOMAS A. 
MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 225 ( 1996). 
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apply to hearsay declarants as well.96 But a fair opportunity to 
"confront" hearsay may require even more. Even more than the 
testimony of a live witness, prosecution hearsay carries the potential for 
surprise. A starting point for a fair adversarial response to hearsay, 
then, must include reasonable notice that hearsay is coming.97 And the 
court's power to exclude hearsay creates the power to condition 
admissibility on broader discovery. As a "price" for admitting hearsay 
in the face of a Confrontation Clause objection, courts can and should 
assure defendants adequate notice and the opportunity to assemble the 
"ammunition" necessary to challenge it.98 In addition, in the many 
cases where a living, breathing hearsay declarant is available for some 
kind of questioning outside of the trial itself, courts may condition the 
admission of hearsay on a right to confront and question that declarant. 
After all, real questioning of a declarant is a better substitute for in-court 
confrontation than the Court's current substitute: a judicial 
determination of reliability based on an assessment of the "firm roots" 
of a given hearsay statement. 
Fifth, and finally, some balancing of interests is inevitable in 
96. For example, we should treat hearsay declarants as prosecution witnesses and 
require the government to disclose any information material to their impeachment, just 
as we do for live witnesses under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). 
Statutory disclosure obligations regarding government witnesses should apply equally to 
hearsay declarants. See Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 1, at 266-69 
(arguing for the application of discovery principles under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
3500, to hearsay declarants). 
97. The Federal Rules of Evidence grant a right of notice to the opponent of 
hearsay, but only in limited circumstances. See FED. R. Evm. 807 (requiring notice from 
the proponent of"residual" hearsay). For a more extensive discussion of the importance 
of notice in responding to prosecution hearsay, see Douglass, Balancing Hearsay, supra 
note 4, at 2152-60. 
98. Perhaps the most significant doctrinal impediment in applying the 
Confrontation Clause to the process of pretrial discovery appears in the plurality opinion 
of Justice Powell in Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 39. There, the Court affirmed the trial court's 
refusal to allow discovery of a state agency's file regarding an investigation into child 
abuse. Defendant sought the file in an effort to gather information that might prove 
useful in cross-examining the state's principal witness. In rejecting defendant's claim, 
Justice Powell wrote that the Confrontation Clause was not "a constitutionally 
compelled rule of pretrial discovery." Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 52. "The right to 
confrontation," he added, "is a trial right." Id. In response, Justice Blackmun's 
concurring opinion states, "there might well be a confrontation violation if. . . a 
defendant is denied pretrial access to information that would make possible effective 
cross-examination of a crucial prosecution witness." Id. at 61-62 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). Years earlier, Justice Brennan likewise suggested that the Confrontation 
Clause may be the appropriate source of discovery rights, where prior statements of 
government witnesses are necessary for effective cross-examination. See Palermo v. 
United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362-63 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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defining the extent of a right to test hearsay. As a practical matter, trials 
require hearsay, and declarants cannot always be produced for live 
cross-examination. Almost by definition, the hearsay-confrontation 
dilemma presents a problem of "second-best" choices.99 The dilemma 
arises, in its most intractable form, when live cross-examination is 
impossible. The Court has responded to that dilemma by prescribing a 
balance based on reliability. But that balance requires us to drift too far 
from the adversarial core of the confrontation right. The Court balances 
the practical necessity for hearsay against the confrontation right by 
asking: "Is the hearsay reliable enough to forego cross-examination?" I 
suggest a slightly different question to govern the balance: "Does the 
defendant have a fair opportunity to test the hearsay?" That is, after all, 
the same kind of question that governs a defendant's right to cross-
examine a live witness. Ultimately, it should serve as our guide in 
defining the right to confront hearsay. 
VI. CONCLUSION: FULL CIRCLE FOR CAUSE AND EFFECT 
Viewing the Confrontation Clause as a right to test hearsay, rather 
than as a right to exclude unreliable hearsay, creates a different set of 
incentives for prosecution and defense. If defendant's right to a fair, 
adversarial testing of hearsay encompasses affirmative rights outside of 
trial, then the prosecutor ignores those rights at the risk of exclusion of 
hearsay. And a defendant who eschews opportunities to exercise those 
rights has little ground to complain that his confrontation rights have 
been violated. Under this approach, courts do not look at hearsay under 
the microscope of "reliability." They must consider how the evidence 
got to trial in the form of hearsay: how opportunities to test the 
information were created, ignored, or even destroyed along the way. By 
doing that much, courts will promote-indeed they will demand-
strategic choices outside of trial that foster confrontation at trial. 
99. Hearsay rules often are described in terms of a "preference" for live testimony, 
along with a willingness to tolerate the second-best alternative of hearsay as a matter of 
necessity in limited cases. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 804(b) advisory committee's note; 
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895). 

